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Although there are perhaps one million species or animals in the world.  
rel:11ivcly few are social (Wilson, 1975al. Even among some groups of an­
imals lhai are well known for their sochility. there are closely r'clatcd species 
tha1 arc no1 social. The ams and honeybees in the inscc1 order Hymenoptcra 
arc recognized as having a complex form of sociali1y. but other species of 
Hymcnop1era are nol social. The parasitic wasps are generally not social. 
Wasps in families closely related to 1he ants arc no1 ,ocial. Wild bee species 
thcH arc related to the so.:ial bees are soli:ai}·. Similar situa:ions can be found 
among other animal groups. Some are sodal. o:hers are no:. We may then 
ask the question. why arc so few animals ,oci�11 In a11empting to answer 
this question. we must also ask the question. how did :,ociali1y evolve' 
1\llempts 10 explain sociality can be classified into descriptive models and 
evolutionary models. Descrip1ive models at1emp1 to infer a pathway for 1he 
develo;:,mcn1 of social behavior from successive stages of sociality ft)\lnd 
among differen: animal groups. The fa:nilial and :he parasocial pathways 
(Vehrencamp. 1979: Lin and Michener. 197�) &re e�amples of des:riptivc 
models. The stages of the familial pathway (Vehrencamp. !979: Wilson. 
1975a) are solitar�. subsocial. intermediate subsocial. and eusocial. In the 
soliwry stage, the adults merely come ,ogether for the purp0ses o:breeding. 
The male leaves or dies immediately after mating. and the female pro, ides 
no parental care for the offspring. ln the subsocial stage. the adults ma1c. 
and one or both parents care for the young for u certain lcng.1h of 1ime. so 
that the generation$ overlap. The young usually leave the care of the parents 
before :be onset of sexual ma:urity. In the imumediat.e subsocia! sta�e. 
;here is also cx:ended p�rco1al tare. and the group members oiat least two 
£Cnerations cooperate 1:1 a variety of acti\'ities such a� for.!ging and defense. 
In 1he eusocial stage. there are the overlappinE penerations. ex1ended pa• 
ren1al care. and coopcr:uion in a variety or :ask�. t>ut al� 1hcre is a repro­
ductive divi"un of labor. with some individ113ls producin£ offspring "hilc 
others do r.ot breed. Since i1 i, ba,cd on ;he premise of increa,ing pJrental 
"�lre. as well as incrc�!\ing ievels of cooperation. th:! fomiiial palhwHy is 
primarily applicable 10 situations in "hich rcl.,1i1-cs. rHrcn:s and offsprinE, 
c0oper�11c with one another. 
V�.rious Sl3ge ... of �ociali1y :!l<.,ng 1hc fomiliaJ path\,�:' n�,·e been d,cribed 
to a ,·arie�)' of antmJJ group$. Among the mamm,11-.. lhc pnmaies. carni\ores. 
Uc•:i-nurt·cs and 1h<: 1�,-oh11.ion oi Social Uclul\ ior 22H 
ccrvids. nnd squirrels pro,·ide ex,1111plc, of different fami!ial sta�c, of 'l'· 
ciaht) (Wibon. 1975al. The naked mule rat, the one manunal that ,ecms 10 
ha,·c a 10:ally eusocial siage. probably belongs "ithin this path"ay <Jarvis. 
l'JRI). In the birds. species that have helpers (Woolfcndcn, 1976: Zahavy. 
1976) belong 10 the fomili,tl p,11hw.iy. Among the in,ects. the ants. termites. 
and many of the bees are belie, ell 10 ,·cprc�ent slllges of the familial pathway 
(Wilson. 1971 ). 
The ram social pathway is based on the prcmhc that cooperation in J!roups 
evolves through aggrcg21ion, of unrelated individuals. ra;her than br ag­
grcgati1,11, of offspring throufh inc!'eascd parental c::re (Lin and Michener. 
1971). The stages of the parasoc1al p.,1hwa1· are as follows (Vehrcncamp. 
1979): ,olirnry. communal. quas,,ocial. ,cmisocial. and eu,ocial. The soii ­
u,ry stage ,s the s&me as in the ramilial pathway. ;\dults come together 10 
breed. In the com1111111al stage adulh of the same seneration form no11cuop• 
crati\'C aggregations. often centerins: around �onie resource such as limited 
nest sites or clumped food. The quasi-social ,1agc invol\'es cooperation 
among the individuals in the aggregation. Such cooperation may involve 
communal nest construction. foraging. or defense against predators. The 
semisocial stage involves cooperation, and ,ilso II reproductive division of 
labor. Up until this point, having t\\O or more generation, overlapping in 
the group is not a necessary condition. l n  the eusocial stage. howe,·er.jus1 
as in the familial pathway. t"o or more generations must be present. as well 
as cooperation and a reprocucti,•e division or labor. 
Ex:tmples of the parasocial pathway are some" hat \par.er than examples 
of the fomilial pathway .. o.mong the mammals. some antelope (Jarman. 197-1). 
pinnipeds (Bartholomew. 1970). and bats (Bradbur)', 1977) aggrega1e. Some 
b21s form stable colonies of unrelated females (McCracken and Bradbury. 
!9:7: Bradburr and Vehrencamp. 19'i6. 1977). and some buffolo form groups 
that have antipredator defenses (Sinclair. )977). Amon� the birds. a number 
o� species form as�rcgations. These may have the function of �llowing the 
b,rds 10 exploit limited nesting si1es /Lack. 1968). exploit patchily dis:ributed 
food <Krebs, 1974). or provide a passive defen.se ;,gainsl predators (?age 
and Whitacre. 1975). In a few species unrelated helper< cooperate with 
breeding individu,lls 1Gas.on. 19,3: Fry. 19��). In ,he ani,. se,eral females 
con:ribute eggs to a communa!I) built nest (Vehrencamp. 1978). Among the 
insects. the vespid wasr, are e�ar.:ples of srnges in the par-asocial pathway 
(Wilson. 1971). 
801h the fomilt;,I pathway and the parasociai pathway describe several 
stages in the evolutton of <oc1aht). bu1 do n01 really �ddrcss 1he "wh;•' of 
,-ocial t>eha,ior. Both model, stre,s cooperation. with 1he cooperauon bi,scd 
on p;1remal care :ind p:..srcn1-c.1f:"sprmg �sssocHnion ,n thi: fmnilial path\\ <-1}. 
and on i�gf:rc:ga1ions ofunrel�t�d ,ndi-:idual:-. in the par�1social pathv.ay. The 
e,,�n11;1l quesuon of,, h� the coopcr:.111on develop:> b n�)l ;,ddr.,:y.;c(!. Many 
otncr anim�I ,pec,es 1h�1 urc rcl«1.:d w the o,:e� cited :1bo, e have not de­
, ch,ri:d rmr �lagc of :sociality. t,nd rer.1ain soHu!l·y. 
:.::rn C. ,\'. Slobod,:hikuff 
Evolutionary models of �ociaht)' 01tc111r1 10 an�wcr the "why"' question. 
Most or the cvol111ionar)' m<ldels have cmrha<izcd a,pects of popuh11ion 
geneti�s. folio" ing the elegant ar�u,ncn1s of Hamilton t 1964) on the evolution 
of sterile workers among the bees and wa�ps. Hamilton suggested that the 
haplodiploid system or the Hymcnoptcra plays a larsc role in the evolution 
of sociality. In the l·l ymenoptcra. males arc haploid with N chromosomes. 
whereas females are diploid with 2N chromosomes. A femnle can choose 
whether or not 10 fertilize ;1n egg. from �perm stored in her spermn1hcc<1. If 
she does not fertilize the egg. the egg develops panhcnogcnc1ic1,lly into :; 
male with a haploid set of chromosomes tSlobodchikoff and Daly. 1971/� 
Hamilton susgested that in norm,d diploid systems p:1rcn1s and offspring.. 
and ;dso two siblings. are relmed to e:1ch other. on the average. by one-half 
of their genes. Howc\'er. because of the haplo(iiploid s)'Stcm of the Hy• 
mcnoptera. a mother and her daughter arc s1ill related by one-half. tiut two 
,isters are related 10 each other by three-quarters. Hamilton rea�oned that 
such a high level of relatedness "'Ould promote cooperation among sisters. 
and the system v.ould e,olve toward a preponderance of cooperating fe­
maies. The relatedness argument has been the bas,s for the concept of the 
selfish gene (Oa,,kins. 19,6). with the assumption that genes promote be­
havior ensuring :he production of more copies of those senes. Since relative< 
are more likely 10 ha,·e copies of the same i:enes than arc strangers. the 
inclusive fitness (the fitness of the animal and its relauves) 1s expected to 
be importa:n b�' 1hese 2rgumen: s. 
Cnfortunately. although Hamilton's inclusi,·e !itness irguments are ele­
g2�1. the) do not explain sociality in ,he general case .. .;11 of the H) me• 
noptera are ha,ilociiploid. but only a few species are social. Althout:h sug• 
gcstions have been made that inbreeding (Ha:nilton, 19,21 or fCne1ic linkage 
(Lacy. 1980) would increase the rclatcdnc;� of termite siblings. none of the 
termites is hapiodiploid, yet they are social. E,·en amon£ the social honey­
bees. quee�s may :r.ate "ith a number of males. lowering the genetic re­
latedness between sisters havbg the same mother but different fathers (Page 
and Metcalf. 198:). Also. the haplodiploid argument does not explain the 
behavior of slave nnls. ,, ·ho coopern1e wi1h their masic� but are not related 
to them /Wilson, 1975b). ln both ants and honevbees. transfers of larac 
numbers of individuals from one colony 10 another �re known (Wilson. 197 I) . 
The individuals transferring 10 a new colony are unlikely to be sister,. yet 
they cooperate with the resident colon� members. 
Other evolutionary models attempt to isolate the conditions under which 
cooperation con develop. A m,1dd by Baylis and Halpin (1982> su;:gests 
lhr¢e circumstance ... in which c1nirnals can develop cooper.alion: aggrcgu� 
ti<.ms. gamete tran�fer. anLI parturi1iun. All lhrce circ.:um�wnces bave the 
po1�n1i,,il for bringing ;�mmnls into dos-e i:--roxirnj1y ,,.,·ith one anothe1. ">�l1ing 
ur 1hc conditi011s nece'isarr r'or thL' <lt\elopmtn1 of �oopcraiivc behavior 
The u-.,,un,p;ion i� tbttt once anim,tl� Jre brought in11-: clo!le proximity. the-y 
curt cvolv..: �ocia! b1..-h;1vior;) Hc.w,e ... ·er. some a:1imals do noi cvo!ve �ocia! 
Ut:,ourt:1•,- 011d t..1'1(: l: xohnioo oi Social IJclHu•iur 
behaviors under 1ho�c .;;ir,u1l'l�t;.m::cs. 'io proximity 1s clctirly a necc�sar� 
condition. bu1 n(;ll a sufficient condi1ion m itself. 
2 A IIESOUHCE -U,\SE .\IOIJEI.. OF SOCIALITY 
I would hke 10 pror<>se an C\'Olutionarr model of sociality that also contains 
some clement< of descripti\'C modd�. I suggc,1 tha: soci.,lity de\'elops in 
resp,orhc to Hn untqua1 diMrihu1ion of resourcc:s. a need to dzfcnd tho�c 
ret,.ources. and :ln inabili1y lo exploit those rc')ources except a� a group. 
These. I suppcst. arc 1hc ultima1c factors causing sociality. Prox1ma1e mech• 
anisms in 1his model. corresp,)ndini.; 10 the evolu1ionary s14cs of the dc­
:;criptive models. arc {I) hilbitul variilbilny anU m:iling sy�tcms: (�) i:uop­
t:r'1tton 3nd afgrc��ion; (}) group size and dominance; and {4} divi)ion of 
labor tn resource extraction. 
3 HAHIT,\T \'ARl-\8lLITY A \'D �IATJ;,.'G SYSTC�IS 
Lei us suppose that in a variable habi1a1. resources are pa1chil) distributed. 
with some patches havrns high-quality resources and others having low­
quality resources. As a further constraint. lei u� s;ipposc 1hat a cn:cnon of 
lo\\•quality patches is a uniform distribution, within the patch. of" subset 
of the ne:essa:-y resources. whereas high-quality patches ha,e v. ithin them 
a variable distribut ion o: a �ubsel of rc�ources. I-or example. an animal 
feeding on dietary items A. 8. C. 0. nnd c ma) find items A. 8. ;,nd C 
uniformly dis1ributed in a low-quality patch. and in  a hifh-quali1y patch mcy 
lind items A-E. but "i:h each item dumped into a subpatch. and 1he sub­
patches random!)' dismbuted within the h1�h-qualit) patch. I predic, that 
low-qualit) uniform pniches "ill suppol1 monofamous animals. v.hereas 
high-quality \'ariablc-distribution patches will suppon polygynous animals 
<Fig. I). 
The rc:<,ons for ltlis pred,c1ion are as follow�. Hith-quali1y pat�hc, ,hould 
have higher carrrmg capacities. a.�d shou!d be ttble 10 support more animals. 
If a high-quality patch has a uniform dis1ribu1ion of rc,ources. anim,ls oc• 
cup)ing !he patcb ha,e 1wo alterna:ives. One is 10 i-hrink their use area of 
1hc pa,ch 10 one that can be defended or exploi1ed by a sin�le. or a1 most 
two, anim�1ls.. The other is to collect a oolygynou� �roup of nnima!s. De<:ause 
of the po;emfal co�ls of in1cranimal ◄i&gre�sion (see hclo,, L t predict tha: 
under thes-e circumsiances ;he animal, \ ill rer::aln \oJi:ary. Jfa hi�!:•quaii1 y 
patch ha� un�quall�· distril-iu4ed re,our:;;;"�. 1h� animal has 1he 'i1me i,vo 
choices di�cus,cd abo,c. Shrin�mg i:s u,(.: urc,� to o:ie that t:a;; he defr:-.tkd 
or c,pl oi!t<l �� one or tv.o a,11n1n.l� nl:!Y it�l"e :ho:>� n.nimt1J... "llhout ac:e,, 
to one or more rc�cur�es. The ahcrnmi,c 1s h) fn,rn <.1 grour of �im�I, that 
z:12 
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could collecti\'ely function in defending or e ·,ploiting all 1hc resources of the 
patch. 
At )east i n  the be;innin� stages of group forma1ion. l predict lh;.H such 
animal assemblages "-Ou)d be polygynous groups. ra;her than groups with 
an equal number of male� and females. This is r·�c,,use of the costs of agi.:res­
sion bee ween males. compc,ing for females . .  - s  Tri\'ers (19,�) has shown. 
females tha1 ha"e a large in"cs1mcn1 in the m, 1ing and postmating process 
(e.g., larger egg. pos,p,trturicion costs) would .end to be choosy in mating 
with males. Such female choice lead;, 10 a large , ·ariance in male reproductive 
success, causing intcrmttle cornpclilion. In ti� beginning stages of group 
formation. such intcrmalc competition would vevent a male from tolera,ing 
another breeding male within the group. However. if the rela,i"e investment 
of male� and females into :he mating and pos1ma1i�g process does not folio" 
this panern. the abo,e condition "-Ould not be expec:ed to ho!d. 
A model somewhat ,imilar to ,he abo,c one \\"as pro;,osed by Witten­
berger ( 19791. In his model. W11tcnberger considered the reiationship be­
t\\een environmental qualn1 and female fitness. io a \'ariant of1he Verner­
Willson-Orians polygynr threshold model tOri:ins. 1969: \"erner and \Vill­
,on. 1966). Wi,:cnt,crger and al�o Altmann c: al. I 19771 suggest :ha1 female 
cooperation may be an tmporwn, com;,onem of the pol}'g)'n)· threshoid 
model. and tha: monc��mous femJk, ,r1t,uld h:i\ � a hi�hcr filne�, \htm p o ­
l��! nou, one, " hen femak, cornr,et..: r,,r re,ource,. bu1 polygynous frmales 
,houki h�1, e ct hjgher indi\'idual fitn��, \\ hen iemal::, cooptralc (Al!mann Cl 
� ,1 .. 1977) !n lo, 1. -qua!ity 1crri1c.1rics. \\.'1uent'�r�er !\Uf?iests that competi1ion 
would Ct'nrn1eract the cffccls of cooperation )0 lha1 mc..mop1m(lU"- female� 
h;,vc a hither fi1nc". "here�, in high-quality terri1ories the neg;t1ive cffecls 
of ,ompc1i1ion v.ould be le" imp,111an1 than the positive benefit of coop­
cntlion. 
111} model doc� nm depend on competition. and 11 predic1s tha: resource 
qualny and dostnbuuon afTec1 both m.ole and female filness. The condnions 
for maximizing male and female fitness .1re not ncccssarilr the same. Down­
howcr and Armit:1ge (1971) showed that" among the yellow-bellied marmots. 
1he '"era�e fcrm,le !i1ne,< "as highcs1 ,n mon<n?amous groups. whereas the 
.overage male fo1ncss ""' highc,1 rn poln:ynous groups. Svendsen (1974) has 
poi111ed out 1ha1 three kinds of females occur in marmol ;ocie1ies: aggressive. 
�ocial. and avoider;. Aggrc,,ivc female, tend 10 live as solilary individ�:,ls 
or rnono1wmou ... 11:iir .... :l.mi hO\'C the highest fitness when the�• are mono--
1.rnmous Social 1'cm:1le, lend 1v love rn wcial groups and have their highest 
firncss rn a luger i?roup. Avoider females lend 10 live by 1hcrnse!ves at 
pcriphernl burrows. Armitngc 11977) has suggested that 1hese rela1ionships 
can be comrlicMc<.I by :he population density, 1he age-sex s1ruc1ure of the 
populriiion, :ind 1he number of yc:,r, !hat rc;idcnts have lived together. Since 
the qunh1y or mormol territories is highly variable (Anderson et al .. 1976), 
the D1)wnh0wcr and Armilage (1971} results do no1 provide a specific test 
or the rclmionship among li1ne,s. ma,ing system. and habitat quality. 
3.1 A Tcsr of the �-loclcl: Gunnison's Prairie Dogs 
Prairie dogs offer Jn excellcnl tcsl of lhc habi:at ,·ariabilit;--ma:ing sys1em 
model. Blaek1ailcd and Gunnison's prairie dogs are social, colonial animals 
that feed on plants ltnd defend 1crri1ories (King, 1955: Fitzgerald and Lcch­
leitncr. I 97J). The territories are defended by coopera1ive groups involving 
one or more males and one or more females (King. 1955). Cooperative be• 
havoor also extends to 1he use of alarm calls. warning 01her prairie dogs of 
the approach of predators (Slobodchikoff and Coast . 1980). The beh�vior of 
the bbcktJikd prairie do;. C�·11omys /11do.-icia1111s. has been studied exten­
si,el)' I:,) Kon!!< 19551 and Hooi;l.md (1977. !979). 
Our "'Or� has concentrated on the Gunnh,on'� prnirie dog. (ynomy.\ gw;• 
11iso11i. This prairie dog. lives in colonial groups in Arizona. 'iew :-kxico. 
Colorado. and L:,ah fHall and Kelson. 1959;. The 1owns or colonies 1end 10 
ha"c fewer an,mab than 1hc hlacklailed prairie dog 10-.·n, <Fi;zgerald and 
Lcchlcnncc. 197�1. Plani species dh·ersity and babirn: \'ariabili?y �re high 
both �I" een IO\\ ns and "i1h1� tO\\nS (Shala"�'. l9'i6J. 
To te\: the model. mr a�socia:es K-en Pai�e. M:�e S.:hwanz :md i m�• 
nipu1atcd 1hc r;:�urz.e� ,•. ithin a '5inglc !Ov.n. The- 10,'-n is loc::.:td on the 
1,;rouni.h o:' the �1useum of �('Ir.hen, Arizona. Three o:her 10,,n .. ;ire \\i:hin 
� J...m. Our m�lmpulJllon� ha\'C :-cc:-. confined l(' onl} 2 �ingle tf'\\ n be<-au,e 
1he v.,nat-iht} in piant spec,es ;i:·e:.ent and phe11 abundanc�s i-el\\eC� c,cn 
:uJ_1t11r, :cn: 1\,)\\.0' b extreme. preciu<ling the comp.an,on of 1.r.:.;,tmcn1 cffc!Ch 
c;. ".\'. S111hvdcl1iknii 
in"olving manipulation of the �m..'.! pJant ,pe�ic> ln dif'l'crenr towns. C,x­
perimental manipulations were carried ou1 from �lay 10 September 1'182. 
Expcrimen1al procedures il1\'0l"ed observation. rcmo,•al. and �upple­
mi.:n1a1ion of resources to create more uniform 1erntorics. 1 he town was 
divided in10 a 110 x 80-m' grid. wi1h srnkes plriced at 10-m interv,,f;. Prairie 
dogs were Jive-1rnppcd. marked with Ladr Clairol hair d)•C, and released. 
The behavior and moverncn1s of 1hc anim,ds were observed wi1h a spolling 
�cope frorn ;; 4-m hit,th obser vation 1nwer positioned at one edge of the grid. 
Movernems and aggressive interactions were noted daily. allowing feet.ling 
1erritori cs 10 be mapped. Obscrva11ons were mode from :l blind on the tower. 
The animals were obsen·cd under normal conditions umil 12 July. when the 
field w<1s mowed "·i1h a tractor-mower. and the pla�ts were mulched into 
the t,tround. T\1,0 \\·Ceks later. each tcrrnory was supplemented \\'ith 800 g 
(5600 kcal) o f  unshelled sunOower seeds. placed in the 1crriwry center. Sun­
flower seeds are part of the normal diet of these prairie dogs (Shalaway. 
1916). and have a caloric value of7 kcal1g. unlike 1he green forbs amJ Grasses 
comprising the rest of the diet 1hat have caloric values of 3-4 kcal•g. Plant 
diversity and djstribution were rmmplcd wi:h line trnnse�ts in each territory 
every 2 "eeks. 
The prairie dogs established feeding 1erri1ories. which they ac1ivel)' de­
fended against intruders (Table I). Although some terrilories had only a 
single male and a single female. most territories early in the season had at 
leas1 one male and more than one female (Tabl e 2J. The territoric� were 
very variable in the caloric content of food plants. that is. 1he Qctual plams 
utilized b)' the animal s for food (Table 3), As 1h� resources increased in 
terms o f  1hc quan1i1y of a"ailable energy (Table 3). the feeding territones 
T;iible L Response oi i\'lean Terri1ory Size of Prairie Dogs to 
Expt!rimcn\a] Trca1mem of Hcsourcer. 
Mean 
T cni?ory Size 
Trcutmeol D�te lm'I F 
None Ma)' 1•-31 . . . - F = 1.41 
:-Jone June I - Joly� :31 F(l. 101. XS 
None June I-Jul� 2 , .. .1.: F •  7. J& 
�lowed July 13--19 603 F(I.IOl" 
Mo�-cd Jui;- 13-19 548 I· � O.�I 
Seed I July : I-Aupu,1 5 J:9 F1 l.l�l.NS 
Sccd1 Jul) :!!-,�.u{:US� 5 �� F =- :.o� 
Sctds August 6-J� =-� Fe 1.1:,1, .KS 
M1..l\\-ed iul� D-19 601 F • .;..96 
Seed> .. �u;u�t r--1'7 �(:� fl 1.10;· 
" Si!;,tUfi..: afll cf< p < 0.05 
T :.ble 2. Mcun �\1mbcr <1( l'·rairic.� Dog., Orcup,'i ng Tcrrhoric!-. in 
HO!->JJU11 .. C 10 t.:xpcrimclll:il Trc..'lllU(UII oi Hc�uur(•t:S 
firne rrr ... ·a1meno .Y s " ,, 
May cnon-d ::.5 0.8-1 6 NS 
Juoe lnOnc) 2.8 0.94 6 NS 
E :orly July tnl(>-.e�I 1.\1 099 8 <0.001 
Uue July- earl y Au�ust (seeds} :.o 0.5, 8 .,s 
�hd-Aupusl H,c..:.ds} 1.9 o.�9 7 NS 
rnn:racted in si2c (Tabk I). and on 1he average there -.ere more animals 
per 1erri1ory (T:,hle �l. 
The experimcn:al manipula1ion of remo,·ing the plant resource, caused 
both an increa,c in the size of the feeding terri1or) and a decrc11se in the 
number or anim•ls per tcrritor)'. Mo,t terri toric, became monogamous. ,n 
the sense that the)' were occupied by a single male �nd a single female (T•blc 
1). Supplemcntinp; the territories with a �ingle food resource (st:nOov.er 
seeds). caused a contraction in the size of the territory 10 appro»imatel)' the 
pretreauncnt levels. but did 001 create a cOl'l'CSponding increase in the num­
ber oi animals occupying the 1crritory. 
These results suggest that although the energetic content of the resources 
innuences the \izc of the feeding territory. energ) 3lone doc� not necessarily 
influence the forma:ion of monogamous or polygynous groups of prairie 
dogs. Since the grou?� rl'm::tined monogamou� when the energetic conicnt 
of the ,erri1ories "a, boosted with a uniform resource. I suggc,1 Ihm an 
'l'ul.lle 3. Calori c Content 01· Food f
>Jant� on Gunnison Pruirie 
Dog Territories• 
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import:ull component of group formu1ion in the prairie tk1gs i� the pre�cncc 
of a diversity of resources, perhaps Jue I(> con1n,in1s of nmrition and w:,1cr 
balance. Prairie dog 1owns ch.ir,1-1cris1icall) ha,e 1hc food re,ourcc\ \"Cr) 
pa1chily dbtributed (Shala" ay, 1976). 
The above darn suggest 1hat Gunni,on·, prainc dogs respond 10 both the 
quant11y of 1hcir resources and the d1,tnbution of the resources. When the 
resource, arc abundanl. diverse. and pa1ch1ly distributed. the prairie dogs 
form polygynous groups. When 1he resources arc uniform. 1hc ,mim.tls form 
monogamous groups. 1\1 present. data on rclati"c fitnesses on 1he territories 
arc no1 ye1 a\'ailable. If. however. the pwirie dogs arc responding in u way 
1ha1 would maximize 1heir fitness, 1hesc rcsulls sug�es1 1ha1 group formal ion 
in prairie dogs follows 1hc predictions of 1hc model. 
This pauern may renect a gene ral 1rend in prairie dog sociali1y. The black­
wiled prairie doti, Cyr1om_,·s /11do,·ici<im11. hvcs in territories that are hi�hly 
variable in patch quality (Halpin, personal communication: Kcl•o. 1938), 
and the predominant mating system is polYti> ni· (King. 1955). The white­
tailed prairie dog, Cynomys ieucurus. Jiles in fairli• uniform. low-quality 
patches. and 11, predominant mating sys1em is monogamy (Clark et al.. 1971 l. 
3.2 Evidence from Other Animal Groups 
The same relationship between resource quality nod £roup formation also 
seems 10 hold true in 1hc case of marmo:s (which arc closely related 10 1he 
prairie dogs). Yellow-bellied marmots. Marmorafla, ·i, e1:1ds. ha"e a \'ariable 
social system C<\rmitagc. 1977). unlike t:ic more solitary eas,em wood­
chucks. Marmoto monax (Barash. 19:i4a). The resource patches used b) the 
yellow-bellied marmots are extremely variable (Andersen e: al.. 1976) and 
most tcrri!orial groups of yellow-bellied marmots arc polyg)"nous. The east­
ern woodchuck tend, to live semicoioniall>• in a more uniform habitat and 
is mosti)' monogamous (l\!erri�m. 1971  >. The Olympic and arc1ic marmots 
live in rather uniform. poor habitat; in family groups of one male. iwo fe­
males. and the young. Out. only one female hears young per year. so 1he 
S)'Stem is functionally mono�amous <Bc.rasi:l. 1974a). 
Similar shifts from monogamy 10 polygyny as a function of resource di,­
tribution can be ,ccn amons the African antelope. Jarman ( 1974) c!assified 
antelope imo fi,.e social groups, depending on :he type of habita, they lived 
in. Class A consists of the duikers and :he dik-diks. animals with small body 
,i2e. They are monogamou;. feed selec:i\'CI\. and stay ;n one vegetation 
t)"pc. The)' take i,emi such a\ nowers. twig tip,. fruih. i,nd �eed pods. food 
1ha1 i� relatively uniformly d1s:ribmed in s�nt::e and time. Class B con,ists 
of rcccfoucks. gerenuks. and lesser kudus. "hi:h are polygynous. ha,·e a 
£roup size of three w ..,i,. with at feast rwo or more adull females in a group. 
They feed on a range (1f £rt1ss species or h:-O\� ,c. rrm<1ining in one or several 
\'e,:cr:,tion types and one home rnngc 1hroughou1 the year. Their iood tend, 
10 t,e ,Nncwha1 dumped ,p,1tio1c:nporally. Cass C m,lude, rhc watcrbuck>, 
He::--um·c·1:..-. ,uul the (:;,·ot111ion or' �of'iill Ur .. h;nior 2:.r; 
�obs. p1Ldles. and impala�. "hich are pol) gynou, and ha, e a  £roup ,izc of 
six to ,ix1y. They reed on a r�1np:e of gras�cs and b10\\ �e rather :.,,clccll\'ely. 
Their diet changes sea,onall). a� docs their preference for ,·egetation t)·pc. 
c aused by even more clumping of resources sp:niotemporally. Class D in­
volves the wildebeests and topis. which arc polygynous and have a gro11p 
size of si)( 10 several hundred thou,and. They feed on grasses. and select 
specific plant parts or growth siages. leading 10 even greater spatiotemporul 
dumping. Class E consists of buffalo and elands. They are p0lyg)'llOus. feed 
on a "idc range of gras,c; or bro" se. and move �ca�on�ll1. Their diet� arc 
diverse and the pa1ehes vary spa1,01cmporally. 
Other animals form larger or smaller groups in rc�ponse to abundance 
and distribution of resources. Coyotes form packs of several animals \\•hen 
large pre)' such tis e!k arc it \'ailuble. Othcrv. .. isc. lhey hunt as solitary �ninnils 
(Bekoff :,nd Wells. 1981  ). When the coyotes form groups. hclrcrs are present 
that .issis1 in territorial and food defense (8ckoff ,md Wells. 1982). Acorn 
woodpecker� seem to have a similar response 10 resource le,·els (S:acey and 
Bock. 1978). Some woodpeckers within a p0pula1ion form social. cooper­
a1ive froup� that store acorns ,n caches. and collectively utihze and defend 
the stored acorns. Other woodpecker< in 1he same population live as tem­
porary monogamous pairs that do not s1orc acorns. These pairs migrate 
during the winier. whereas the soc,al groups do not. lvlonogamous individ­
uals seem to be less efficient thnn groups at harvcstin& acorns. Primate 
studies (Clunon•Brock and Haney. 19i7: Milton and May. 1976: Southwick 
and Siddiqi. 19i�) relating ecology 10 so:ial organization senerally suggesl 
that monofam} o;:curs io pat:hes with uniform!� distributed resources. 
"·here-.is polyg� n)' occurs in patchy resource distribu1ions. Monogamous 
species tend 10 occupy la�ge home ranges CCluuon-Broc� and Harvey. 1977), 
Baboon groups 1end 10 be. larger when rc,ources have high densities but 
very patchy distributions (Altmann. 197�). 
-' COOPERATIOi\' AXO AGGRESSION 
Ii animals are 10 join groups in order 10 exploit or defend essential resour;:es. 
the animals mu�t be able 10 cooperate with one another. Noncoopera1ive 
aggregation may be impor1ant to some animals such as colonial sea birds 
(Lack., 1968) for exploiting limiting nesting sites. but without cooperation 
the evolution of social behavior is not possible. Cooperation in 1urn requires 
limiti�g or controllinp; aggressi,·e in1era<:11ons "ithin 1he group. ,o that the 
:mimnls are relati\'cly free to pursue ('Ith::- acti, i:.les in rca,on:tbl�, close 
proximi.) 10 o:her memoer- of :heir group. Thi, mca::s :he de,elopmen: of 
mcch�1nis:ns �hat :s.llo,, a cur:ailme:,t <-'f pcr)('ln�il space a::.d othl.!'r �.ggre'-sive 
tcnde:;::ies 1r.a: mar r-:�uh in noncoorerJt10n and �roup cii)integr-cttion. In 
th1" :-.cc:ion I would lite 10 Ctm�i<ler hem c,11,,.1pt!nstion ma:, �r1,c. �m! the 
gcnl!ral r-elation:--h1p bet\�een cooreration i111d aggr�!>sion in sr•ci:.il group�. 
2:iR C:. �- Sloluult-hikuff 
4.1 A GanH ..:-Thcol'<:Cit: t\pprnac:h to C.:oopcr(ltion 
Ofle promising ,,pproach to the question of cooper.Ilion h,,s been a 1?amc-
1heoretic one. Game theory has been applied 10 biological problems in  a 
number of contexts, pr incipally in an analysis of the strntegies of aggressive 
behavior (Maynarll Smith and Price. 1973). A basic componcn, of the ap­
proach is a payoff matrix that expresses what each player is expected to 
win by pursuing �_given strmes>- l f a  player pursue, a �in!',IC ,1r111cgy, this 
is known as a pure strategy. If the player u�cs more than one strategy based 
on a certain proh.ibiht) or cxpeeiation of winning, this is called a mixed 
strategy. In a game. a pla)er usually can play a pure or a mixed strategy 
that consistently provides the hi!?hCM payoff for the conditions of the game. 
In other words. for the particular game, no other strategy will yield bcuer 
results (Maynard Smith, I 98�). Maynard Smith and Price ( 1973) oriGinally 
considered that an animaJ would be sene1;cally programmed to play a p:ir­
tieular strat egy. ,md defined an evolutionary stable strategy (ESS) as a Strat­
egy that cannot be bcalcn by a mutant playing another strategy. In behavioral 
terms, animals are rarely genetically progrnmmed to p!a)' only one pa:-ticular 
stra1egy. bu1 an unalogous situation occurs. Tne animal could play a be­
haviorally stable strategy (BSS) that cannot be beaten by another animal 
playing another strategy. Game theor)' analysis of.en invoh•es equilibrium 
points, most notably the Pareto equilibrium and the Nash equilibrium. The 
other authors on social beba,·ior in this volume a!so deal extensi vely with 
d game-theoretic approach. 
Axelrod and Hamilton (1981) ha, e formalized some of the requirement� 
for coopcr�tion, using a game•theoretic approach. Figure ::? shows a payoff 
matrix for a game situation called the Prisoner's Dilemma (Rapoport and 
Chammah. 1965). in this game. :he Prisoner (Player I) h2s several choices. 
One choice is to play C (cooperation). and if Player 2 also plays C. that is. 
if thC)' mu1ually cooperate. Player I receive, n payoff of 3. in arbitrary units. 
On the other hand, if Pl,iyer I plays C and Player 2 plays D (derec,ionl. 
Player I receives a payoff of 0. the "suckers payoff ... Player ! can get the 
hii;hest payoff in this ga:ne by playin� D when Pla�er 2 pla�� C. As pan of 
the Dilemma. Pla)•er I recei,es a payoff of only I if both players play D. 
One BSS is D-D. that is. neither animal cooperates. because tile costs of 
consis,ently playing C to a D are too high Uxdrod and Hami!ton. 1981 ). 
This may explain from a game•theoretic pornt of view why so few animals 
nre social. The costs of coo;,eration ma, be 100 high in man} circumsiances. 
Ho"cvcr. the pa,•off for C-C may be prof:table "hen a group is necessary 
for extracting o r  deiending a rewurce. Then 1he pennh) of noncooperation 
for an ind1\ldual animai may be co1h1dcr��ly inori: 1hirn 1hc ··sucker's pay­
otr of 1r�inJ? and failing to elicit cooper(llion. This would be particuiarly 
true \\ hen mtcrind1, idual <,ggression w11h1n the group follows a p:ttrern of 
deC"line with mcn:�::?�ing: soci:-d ity. Cor example. in11uf!r oup ag;;.rc,,ion \_1f pri­
m;nes <Bern�tetn. 1976). lions <Bygoff ct al .. 11179>,  a11J bees /Lin and Mich-
Rc•!'-,,m•c·1•:,. u1ul lhc E\·olutioo oi' Social 8chm· iof' 
0: 
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Fi&urc 2. The payoff m;itnx 01· tht Priwncr's Dil\'.arunu. The 1)3}-0IT i..'I cxprc,sed m arbitrar)' 
um1, for Pl a)cr l. C de")l$t:.&tc:� cooperation. Ddcs1gn:ues. ddec-t100. Pi:ayer I receives ::. ;,,a�off 
orT "'hen Ptayer I p!a\S D 10 Ptarcr 1·s. C. a p!l)Off of R for C-C. a i>a>·off or P for D· D. and 
S for C-D. fayorri arc �1ructurec! so that T par1 the most and S p.i.)> th: le.a.st. A n:cc�'-arv 
tt'lnd1uoo for the dt\' clopmcnt of cooper-.i.cion is htgh indi,:idua1 rccoe,:'lltio:,. tfiF,urc is modified 
from A\t�rod :.end Hamiltan. 1981 Cop)':'i�ht 3981 by lht Amcri con Associ..at�n for the ,•\d­
-.· ane:emcnl of �u:n:;c:,l 
ener. 197�). 2nd --·hen resource extraction increa,es with soci2lit). for ex­
ample. bird Occk inte&ra1ion (Macdonald and Henderson. 19ii: Krebs. 19i4) 
(sec Fig. 3_t. 
�.2 The lnflu,mce of Inclhidual Hccognition 
Axelrod and Hamilton (19811 show that another BSS is 10 play C first. and 
then fol!ow lhe othe: plltyer's lead. a tit-for-tat stra:egy. If Playe r �  plays 
D. then Plarer I pla}S D. bu: if Player: pl ays C. then Player I coati.nues 
to pla} C until Player :  swi.ches. The prediction of Axelrod and Hamilton 
i� 1hat this strategy would work best when lherc is individual recognition 
among animllls. and when individuals play the game & number of times 
ag«inst other individuals th3l they know. so that they can predict the re­
spon�e. Frequent contact bet"een animals may occur initially \\hen home 
r�rn�<;!-- O\'Crlap. or when Lcrritorfa( anim�Js meet frequentl}" m boundaries. 
for e�:-1 mpie. tne home ranges of gre} ,<.1 uirrels overJap. and individuals can 
r�co;;nize their ndi;hbors {Thomp�on. 19:'8>. �cighbor recogmtion ha� been 
de�.:rit'led bct\\tcn t\\O species of ::irnhores (8ar�1 �h. 19-➔bJ. as well &� for 
�� Y�1riet� of C<.1n,;pe�ific tird\. niitmma!s (\\"ibon. I Y75aL some amphihi:;,ns 
Uat:f�r. IY8 I J and ant'> cL1:,um e: al. . 1979) \\'hen such neigh ho� re"·ognition 
240 C ,\' , Slol,udd1il ..oif 
occurs. it may iakc 1he form of 1hc ··dc" r cncmr·· response. where unimuh, 
show lcs, ,, g!!rcs,ion toward neighbors 1han tO\\ ard stranger� {Wil�on. 
1975al. 
The mechanisms through which animals ma) recognize other individuals. 
particulary kin. have bee:1 rc,·iewcd b)' Bck<•IT ( 1983). who sugtested ,c, crnl 
ways throu�h which such recognition can develop: I I) genetic mechan1>ms: 
(2) recognition of phenotypic comparisons; and (3) recognition based on 
familiarity and spatial as,ociation. Genetic mechani,m, ofiden1ifying rclt11cd 
individuals from 1he same colon) ha\'C been described for some bees I Urccd. 
198 I ;  Ureenl,cr�. 1979). Recognition by phcnot)'pic comparisons nwy oc<!rir 
through b,rning 10 distinguish the phenol)•pic differences of 01hcr individual 
animals. Rcco�nition b;,sed on famili3rity and spatial �ssoci,,lions seems 10 
be a common way of identifying individual, {Mar
l
er. J9i6). 
4.3 Philop�try and Cooperation 
The above mechanisms for individual recognition obvious))' arc no! mu1Ually 
excl usive. and a, leas, t-.o of the mcchani>ms may be promoted b)• philo­
patry. Philopa1ry is ihe tendency of animals of one sex or 1hc other 10 su, y 
near their parents. or to stay on or near u panicular plo1 of land where 1hcy 
were born. Philopatr)' is 2 common phenomenon. wi1h examples known from 
a number of nnimal groups (Shields. 1982). The nondispersing sex varies 
with the animal t:roup. Among the mammals, males tend 10 disperse "hile 
females tend 10 ,cttle close to their mothers (Waser and Jones. per�onal 
communication). In the birds. ,he females 1cnd to disp�rse. -. hereas the 
males ,cnle close 10 their father (Vchrenc:imp. 1979). 
Such as,ociatio:ts among nondispersing individuals provide the ra" ma­
terials for the developmeni of individual rccog.nition and cooperation. Kin 
selection may s:un off the cooperative process, although i, is not a necessary 
condition for coorcration. An example of a probably kin-selected sys1cm of 
rhilopa1ry is that of1he ground squirrel {Michener. 1981). The t)·picul pa11ern 
is for female juveniles 10 scu!e near !heir mother's territory. The mother 
may contract her 1crritory or the female juvenile may inherit her mothers 
terri:ory. While ,n the earl y evolutionar) s:ages of this system each animal 
dcfcr.ds 1hc perimeter oii1s own territor). The dc,clopmcnt of cooperation. 
as in the prairie doss. allows a shared dcfen>C of the perimeter of a common 
territory. An example of,, probabli• nonk,n selected system is :hat or the 
ncotn:,pical fruit bat. Phyllostomus hasraws (�kCracken and Bradbur). 
1977). Female, form cohes,,·e stable froup, that cluster in potholes of hme­
$tOne '""'es ,n Tnn1dad. Th� female groups ma11i13in rela1i,-c1�- cxctu,i"e 
foraging area�. an<l \ hen they find a rich fOl'>d source. 1hey vocalize lo �uracl 
1hcir roost m,11cs. 1'e" groups of fcm,d es ar� formed by the ou�1ed ) ouny,­
ters from all the harems tn the cave. Once ,1 nC\\ y.ru11p j..; u�,cmblcd. ii \l�•Y� 
St:Jblc in .,;,:ompo�llH)rt for· •nany �t:«?""-, 
H••�our'l'l"l'o r11ul 1hr, E\•ol111iw1 of �or.i11l Jlt>h:nior 
..i • .i Cusb :uu:I u,�ncfits of Aggr,�s�lon and ltcisource l�.�; tra(: tion 
On a ,·err sim1>lc lc"cl. 1hc r,roccss of forming g,·oup; through cooperation 
c.in he treated as a cos1-bencfi1 analysis. ln<Jiviclual fi tness in ;, gl'0up is 
c<1ual to the t:>cncfit frnm resource cx1r.,cti�1n minus the cost of aggression 
(Fig. 3). If the bcnefi1 is greater than the cost. the nnimal should st11y in the 
group. If the cos1 is greater. 1hc animal should leave. This can be stated 
more formally hy the following equations: 
IFo - f(REI ( 11 
IF• ; fiRJ::) f(A) (1) 
IF. C 8 - C  (3) 
if B < C. then leave 
if lJ > C. then stay 
where IF is individual litncss. RE i) rc,ource extraction. A is aggres<ion. B 
is benelits, and C is costs. Equation (I I shows that the ind" idual fitness of 
a solitary animal (IF0) is a function of the ability of the animal 10 extract 
resources alone. whereas Equation (�) shows that the indh·idual fitness of 
an animal in a group UF,) is a function of ,,s ability to extrac1 rc�ource� in 
a group. minus a function of the costs of aggression in the Gf0up. This Iran�-
" 
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latcs into Equation (3). the individual fitness in a group i, rcl<1tcd lo lhe 
1,cncfit, minus 1he costs or being in 1hc group, with 1hc animal �laying in 
the group if the bencfi1s exceed the coses. 
G GHOL:1' SIZE A,\'O 00.\IINA;\'CE 
Group size and dominance are discussed extensively b)' Caraco and Pulliam 
in Chapter 10. so the discussion here "'ill center on a fc" of 1he relevant 
details of 1hc rela1ionship among group sizt. dom;nance. and lhc devclop­
menl of sociali1y. 
As animals form groups. the costs .ind bcncfi1� 10 each animal of being 
in a group ma)' potentially change wilh the size of the srour. Too few animals 
in lhc group miw 001 he able lo exlract or dci<:nd n resource in such ct wny 
as 10 provide sufficicnl bMcfit. per individual animal, for being a group. Too 
many animals mar increase the costs of aggression. or Jcplete the resource. 
Krebs (197-l) shows 1ha1 heron flocks have a resource cx1rnc1ion curve that 
peaks at a certain {!roup �ize. lhen falls as more flock numbers are added. 
This lends 10 the question. asked by O.raco and Pulliam: Is 1here an optimal 
group size for animals? 
C.1rnco and Pulliam show that in a group, not all the anim?Js may ha,•e 
the same fitness. Dominance rcla1io�ships ma)' de•clop. and the dominants 
may acquire access 10 more resources. For example. dominan1 vespid wasps 
tend to become reproductive queens more frequenll) 1han subordinates 
(West. 1967). l n  mulliple-queen nests. the dominant vespid wasp queen pre­
, ents reprodu:tion of �ubordina1cs by eating 1heir eggs. and a!so forces 
subordinates 10 pursue riskier and energe1icall)' more expensive casks 
(?\'oonan, 1981 ). A similar process occurs in bumblebees (Heinrich, 1979). 
In bird flocks. dominan1 bird� may use subordma1es to ensure a betler supply 
of resources (Roh..,er. 1977). 
As Caraco :ind Pulliam poin: out. group size c�n be considered from the 
s1andpoint of Frc1well' s ( 1972) Habitat Selec1ion model. Dominants do helter 
in bcuer-quality habi1a1s. Subordinates do worse. but ,bey can do better in 
a poorer-qualil11 habi1a1 only if they can become dorninan1 ia ,hat hab1ta1. 
If 1hcy swi1ch to the poorer habi1a1 and remain low-ranking subordina1c,. 
1hey do much worse 1han if they had ,rnyed in 1heir original group. The nee 
result is 1ha1 the ;roup size would be shif1cd to maximize 1he mean fi1ncss 
of the group. and not necessarily the fi1ncss of the dorninan1$ /Fig. 4J. An 
e�amplc i� the analrsis of lion group Sile by Caraco a�d Wolf I 1975). Al­
though 1he group ,izc for hunung ;;mall prey was determined by the phys­
iolog1ca! limns of ,he lior.s. the group size of lion'> hun�m� larp.er prey was 
offsc1 in 1he direction of 1hc mean fi1ncs� oi :he group. Thus. "hen 1he hon� 
hunt lar�cr prey that ran ;iroviJe more food pc, lion ,han the required ph) s ­
iologic:al minimum. 1hc group size of 1he hunling females ,� :101 :,: the op­
:imum that would maximize the calorh.: retu: ·n. !ns!ead. the �roup size i s  














l•'igure ◄. Th: mcun fhnch of group ,it
.cs under (he C"..:md1tK>ns C'I( dornin,mrc anJ Frc11,,,,eU's 
i 197�• !lao,tat Sdtttion model. Jc:11 ner" cc..-1\(: ' v.i!hfo lht< i;roop. dn1-ing the srour ,1 zc �wo1) 
fr<.>m �ht' o;mmum �nd to-.-.J'."d :he point \.\ here t2::-0 .en1:nal reccJ\'tf. a d1-s.tribu11on ol' ,-es.01.: rc�" 
th.ii JU-S.t �auslit, 1hi:- r:w umum ph)"-iolo�.i ::.11 rcqui,cmcn1; of the ;rniinal •IJ. 
incre2sed. so tha, c;;ch lion receives. on the average. only enough food 10 
satisfy the physiological minimum caloric intake. 
I sug�esi that in a variable. pa:;hy habita,. a social unit will tend ,o collect 
gro�p members. If the costs or aggression are high for the dominants 10 cje;t 
ne" comer$. the group "ill collect more member,. The domin�nts may be 
willing to suffer a small drop in fitness b)' having more group members. 
raiher than face a larfe drop in fitnesi. 1-y incurring 1he costs of ejecting 
joiner;,. On the other hand.joiners in a c,,lony may sta)' in the �roup bcc.iuse 
of the low probahi!ity of surviving a� a so!iiary individual. This ffi/i) c�plain 
the initial stages in the formation of large colonies of tcrmnes end honeybees. 
and does not have to be a kin-selected arsumen!. 
5.J The Probability oi Breeding and the £, olulion oi C'.a1,tes 
lf an anim�d ha� no probabili1y of breeding as a �oln�r� individual. and a 
very 1t,w probability of breeding in & group. I predict that the animal will 
join the group. For example. if an animal had the follow,n� options: 
pl/Fol = 0 
JHIF,1 • !(l-'· 
wher� the ,-,, /F11 1 i$ �l mea�ur� of lhc prot'\:1bilit� • .11' breclling a, ;, soliuu y 
ind,\'idu�I. tind the pl IF;i rcp:-esents th;: iJrC1bahi1it> ofbrccdi!"!g in t.i grour. 
selc.;lhJn ,hould fr1vor �hoo�mg a group c,\·er choo-:in� H.' be �olit;�r:,. , 
C. X. SlolJodchikoii' 
This is essentially the choitc open to the social insect, that htt\' C IK>n• 
rcproduclive C<l Sles. /\ honcybce. ant. or termite 1hn1 nbandons lhc nesl or 
hive would nm he able 10 survive 10 1he poin1 ofpl'oducing viable offspting. 
Al lhal stage. ils filness is zero. J-lowe,·er. a nonreprodllctive in the social 
insects has a certain probability, albeit small. duri ng a narrow window in 
its life-span of becoming. a reproductive and reaping enormous benefits in 
terms of fi tnc�s. For example, honeybees become workers or que.cns a:S a 
f, mction of diet. that is, whether they are fed royal jelly throughout tneir " 
larval life or only fot a few days. Each egg potentially can become a queen. 
Jn fact, few do so, but the probability of becoming a breeding individual is 
still present. Even as adult workers. nonrcproductivc femal es arc capable 
of occ,1sionally laying nrnle eggs and contributing minutely to their potential 
fi1ncss (Wilson, 1971 ). Among :he ants and the 1ermites similar windows 
occur (Wilson, 1971). so that each individual can potemially become a , ·c­
produc1ivc. Even among th� soch1lly more primi1ive bees ;md \\'asps, where 
queens are often the largest females, larval diet determines 10 a large extent 
the size of the individual (Noonan. 198!). and. consequently. the probability 
of breeding. 
The scenari o that l suggest for :he evolution of nonreproductivc cas:cs 
is as follows. Initially. individuals form groups. eventually increasing the 
group size beyond the optimal level. These individuals develop some meas­
Lire of cooperation among themselves. As a group. they can extract and 
defend resources much more efficicn:ly than the,· can as solit ary individuals. 
In the group. dominance relationships arise. Cooperative behavior and a 
larger group size alJow a modifica1ion of the immediate habirnt for the pur­
pose oi food storage and shelter. and the modifications ameliorate the daily 
physiologic.ii stresses placed on each animal in the group. The animals be­
come specialists in cooperative resource extraction. perhaps in response to 
competition from solitary. nonsocial animals. Although they may be more 
efficiem at resour ce extraction and defense. as a group. their efficiency at 
performing the entire gamut of tasks required for resource extraction de­
ciines. compared with that of solitari· animals. Modification of habitat and 
efficiency of resource extraction reduce the probability of breeding as a 
solitary individual, so that a1 this point the animals become locked inio a 
social existence. The dominance relationships allow manipulation of colony 
members lthis is analogous to the m:mipulatioo arguments of Al exander 
(1974)j. in such a way that the dominants breed while the subordinates do 
nm. This dominam-subnrdin2t c relationship, however. can only be Slip• 
ported if all group members have a chance. however small. of hecomin;g a 
dorninan1 at some point in their lifetime. 
Among many of 1hc s�)::if1l rnarnm:11� amJ binh. lhL' earlier s1,1gc:) of 1i'ii:, 
:--,�cn�1 rio are evident. in tile insec1s. somt! of the lmer imcrmcdi<!\.e s1ages 
leading lO eusociali1y and .:.-asi e forma1ion can be �ee-n. particularly among 
the hulictid bees tBreed and Gamboa. 1\177: Michener anr.i Br0thcrs. I97-l: 
�iichcn�r ct aL. 1971 L �bmmab and bird:-- ha\·t: apparl'nlly nm de\·elopc<l 
lksoun:cs mul rhc l in1h11io11 of $m:i;1f lh:hadur 
true nonreproduc1ivc c as1es 1 \Vilh the exception oft he naked mole rat. which 
requires extensive coopcr<ltion for modifying its habi!al and cxtrac1ing re­
sources (Jarvis. 1981). Panial nonreproductives in the form of helpers. how­
ever. are known in both mamm;ib rind birds rBckof!'. 1983; £mien, J98�a.b). 
Perhaps rnamm;tls and birds have nm evolved social �)'stems with non­
reproductive castes because of 1he interplay of body size. resource pani• 
tioning, and competition. }.fay (l978i has shown that generally as body size 
among 1axa decreases. the number of species increases. \.Vith more species 
prescn1, we can assume that there is more �uhdivision of the a\'ailable re­
�oun.:cs in rc�ponse to comrctition. thH!. is. more �pcchil iza1ion on sub-sets 
of resources. Increased body size and fe\\'er species imply a broader par­
titioning of resources in response to competit ion. Perhaps because of more 
broadly panitioned resources, the birds and mammals have not become cn­
operntive spcch.1li�ts c1l the expense of individual effici ency to 1he �a:nc ex­
tent as the social insects. 
6 OJv1SION OF LABOR I,\' RESOURCE EXTRACTION 
Once social animals cross the threshold and become cooperative specialists. 
they C<m ex1rac1 a set of resources by having individual animals specialize 
on one resource in the set. This is the basis for nower constancy in honeybees 
and m,\joring in bumblebees (Heinrich. 1979). Specia!i2.ition on one type of 
resource by each animal in the group can increase the animal's efficiency 
C 
ri;;un'! l'i. .� h}'P<Hheti �31 cur-.·<: \h(>win;; 1hc tm;'):�c1 of C"'Opcr;:i li\'<.' <.o:1ene-: or, s�ci:!:-. oi­
\'Cr,ily of tomp-:1.iwr� in 1h: 1mm.:d i:u c  h:.1 f\i 1?.L .-h ..:01\pcr:�!i\·:- <i.ocial i1r d-::\::ki ps I from left h' 
r u;:ho. <.r,�i;i�, di\er-..11� nf rnn)pc:ll<'r,; U1!t1'C:Jse,. Tht mpid Jetre.tw in .:.p�;;i�:i diwr:-.n: • oc-:ur, 
:u Uh' ,uigc in wh}..:h. the '!-1.)d:.,! g:r(1u r, di:\ i:-l vp, �•,.,,lr:<:�,fr.'" ,pee i�l1,:, thro-t: �h dh 1-:B,m t.>f i.i l;m 
m rc,_,.·,urc:: c,.r:Jt-:i1(lO, 
.:uu C. S. �lobodc:hil...off 
;11 collecting that resource. It C(ln ;,lso inc-reuse 1he cfficitncy of lhC group 
in tx11t1c1ing the entire �• of av=tilable re�ources. At thi!o stage. CH\'.h indi­
vidual in the group may not be as good 11 competitor wilh a soh1.1r)' animal 
over the cn1ire range of resources. but the group. h} being composed of 
spcci:disls. becomes a goNI compe111or with soliiari• animals at explo,ung 
1hc entire re�ource set. This in turn cnn affect the divcrsili• of species round 
in the viciml)' of eusocial groups (Fig. S). Such an effect crn1 have a profound 
impact on the dynamics of communities. Honeybees. for example. can 
quickly replace a number of wild bee specie, a� major pollinator� of some 
:,gricuhural communities (Wilson. 1971 ). Ant species can deprc,s the abun­
dance of their closest compctnors (Holldobler and Wilson. 19i71. 
; Sl'MMAIW 
J suggest that in evolutionary terms. social beha"ior has developed in re• 
spon�c 10 the distribution and abundance of resources. I de"elop a hypoth• 
esis that proposes four s.agcs in the c, olution of sociality: ( l )  habi:a: \'ar­
iability and m1,1ing S)'Stems: (2) cooperation and aggression: 13! group size 
and dominance; and (4) division of labor in resource extraction. Initial con­
ditions for group formation involve a patchy i1abitat. ranging from lov. -qual­
it)' uniform patches 10 high-quality pa1ches where subse:s of resources arc 
clumped and distributed randomly. I suggest that low-quality uniform 
patch�� promote monogamy or solitary. nonsocial beha,•ior. wherea$ high­
quality patches with variable distributions of resource subsets promote pO· 
lyg) nous associations that yield more efficient resource eMraction and re­
,ource defense. 
In forming p0l)'l;ynous associations. animals have the opponuni:)' to co• 
opernte with each other. Development of such coopcr,uion ma)' be promoted 
by indi"idual recognition and philopa:ry. As cot>peration de"elops. rc�ource 
cxtractioo or defense in�rcases in efficiency while imeranimal aggression 
within ihe group decreases. 
Within cooperative �roups. dominance rcla1ionships often develop which 
ha,·.:: a profound effect on the group size. Oe,·e.lopmcnt of such dominance 
relation;hips alio11s the group size to increase. since subordinates or joiners 
often cannot improve lheir fitness by mo·cing 10 ano:her group. This tend� 
to increase the group size to a point v.here each animal in the group receives 
no: the optimal acc<"ss 10 reso1Jr:es. but access to :he required physiolo�ical 
minimum. 
T;)rou;h coopera1ion. social groups c.:m modify �heir immedia1c 1iurrouml• 
ings ,e.g . .  build nests) and amehor.ne the physiolo�ical stre.s placed on 
inJI\ iduals by ab1otic fi1 c1ors . .  .;.: :he ,:1me time. lhrough cooprrntion. a 
::-oci�1I group can C"'ecom!' collectively \Cr} efficient at ex11J.;ting. resources. 
Hahi1at modtficmion ind effi:::!ea�') �: rtsource e,;rncti..,.,:, m�� affe.: l the 
probabihty of �recd in� of dn anim:tl in a �oci.11 grour,. to chc po1:it \\ here it 
ne�oun·c:i,, and tlw H,·nl111io11 or Sot:ial u._.ha,ior 2J7 
becomes un,,ble 10 reproduce .is a soli1ary animal. Al 1ha1 point. selection 
ma) fnvor 1hc animal's participation in 1he formation of nonreproducti,·e 
ca�1e,. as Ion� as the ,onimal h;os even a small probabili1y of being 11blc to 
reproduce al ,ome point in i1s life cycle. 
Once social group, develop 10 the point of dividing up 1he lahorof resource 
cx1rac1ion, indi"iduals wi1hin the group may become specialists on subsc1, 
of re,ourccs (e.g., the flower constancy of honeybees). As a group of ,pc­
cialists. 1he social group may then be able 10 outcompete solitary species 
. 1ha1 arc generahs1s on" set of resources, and. as such. social species may 
profoundly ,,ffcc1 the di\'crsi1y of 01hcr species in their immediate habi1a1s. 
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